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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals is conferred statutorily 
by U.C.A. 77-35-26 and Rule 26 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
which gives the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals 
from final judgments in the Seventh Judicial District Court. 
I 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
Post Conviction Relief on the 16th day of April, 1992. The state 
filed a Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion To 
Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the 30th day of 
April, 1992. The Motion To Dismiss was based upon the ninety day 
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. 78-12-31.1, 
which bars any Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus not filed within 
a ninety day period from the date that the cause of action accrued. 
The Appellant filed a Motion For Extension of Time with the 
District Court on the 19th day of May, 1992. The District Court 
granted said extension on the 28th day of May, 1992. 
The Appellant filed an Objection and Request For Hearing on 
the 5th day of June, 1992, wherein, he specifically stated why the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief 
should not be barred by the ninety day statute of limitations. The 
Memorandum in Response to the Petitioner's Objection was filed on 
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the 10th day of June, 1992. 
The District Court granted the Attorney General's Motion To 
Dismiss on the 12th day of June, 1992, and the final Order was 
entered therein on the 22nd day of June, 1992. The Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief was 
based upon the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel at the 
time of Petitioner's plea agreement in his criminal case and at the 
time of sentencing. The Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus was also based upon an affidavit which he had obtained from 
a co-defendant who had been an adverse witness against the 
Petitioner and for the state in his associated criminal 
prosecution. Said affidavit rescinded an incriminating statement 
which had been previously made by said co-defendant. 
On or about October 5, 1992, Appellant filed a brief with the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
On or about October 16, 1992, the Appellee file a Motion for 
Extension of Time to respond to Appellant's brief. Appellee's 
Motion for Extension of Time was granted until December 7, 1992. 
On or about November 18, 1992, Angela F. Micklos, Assistant 
Attorney General filed a Substitution of Counsel. 
On or about December'7, 1992, Brief of Appellee was filed. 
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II 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Appellant concedes that three month limitation on the 
filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus is a 
procedural limitation, 
B. The State Constitution gives the Supreme Court 
the right to impose procedural limitations, 
C. Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31,1 does not 
contain any provision for excusable delay, 
D. Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31,1 was not 
intended to apply to the Appellant, 
III 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Appellant concedes that three month limitation 
on the filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
is a procedural limitation. 
In Appellee's brief p.5 and 6, it is argued that the Courts 
can impose a procedural limitation on the filing of a Petition For 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. In the very first paragraph of Appellant's 
argument in his Brief on p.9 he states that he acknowledges that 
the State may apply a reasonable procedural limitation on the 
filing of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. However, the 
appellant argues that a ninety day procedural limitation is much to 
restrictive and unreasonable, and thus, is unconstitutional. 
Appellee states also in the first paragraph on p.6, of his 
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brief, "Petitioner claims that §78-12-31.1 is not a procedural 
limitation, implying that §78-12-31.1 suspends the right to 
Petition the Court for Habeas Corpus relief." The appellant, at no 
time, in his brief states that §78-12-31.1 is not a procedural 
limitation, and certainly does not imply that because it is a 
statute of limitation, it suspends the right to petition the Court 
of habeas corpus relief. To the contrary, appellant agrees that 
if a procedural limitation provides for a reasonable time period in 
which to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus, it can, in fact be 
constitutional. 
B. The State Constitution gives the Supreme Court not the 
Legislature the right to impose procedural limitations. 
The appellee, apparently, in response to appellant's brief, 
states that the Utah Constitution does not give the Supreme Court 
the right to impose procedural limitations on the filing of actions 
such as the Petitions For Writs of Habeas Corpus. It specifically 
gives examples of what it interprets the Supreme Court's rules 
adoption powers to include, i.e. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of 
Evidence, and Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, appellee 
fails to point out that the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, contain many procedural limitations on the 
filing of actions. For example: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 3, states that a civil action is) commenced by either the 
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filing of a complaint or by the service of a summons. However, if 
the action is commenced by service of a summons, the complaint must 
be filed within 10 days of said service or the action is dismissed 
and court has no more jurisdiction thereof. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 4, states that when an civil action is commenced by 
the filing of a complaint with the court, the summons and copy of 
the complaint must be served upon the defendant within 120 days 
after the filing the complaint or the action shall be dismissed on 
application by any party or on the Court's own initiative. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 state that in a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the 
trial court, that appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. It is well 
established that after that 30 day period the Appellant would be 
procedurally barred from filing its appeal. 
It is unclear whether Appellee is claiming that the time limit 
is a statute of limitations or a procedural limitation. On p.9 of 
appellee's brief it states that, "since §78-12-31.1 is a statute of 
limitations, rather than a rule it does not fall within the 
boundaries of Article III, Section 4." (Emphasis added) In 
appellant's brief, State * vs. Fowler. 752 P.2d 497 (Ariz. APP. 
1987), was cited, which specifically pointed out the difference 
between a statute of limitations and procedural limitation and 
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found that a one year limit on filing for post conviction relief 
was procedural in nature. It is very clear from the criteria set 
forth in that case Utah Code Annotated 78-12-31.1 is a procedural 
limitation and not a statute of limitations. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court, in Article VIII Section 4, is vested with the power 
to enact procedural limitations and not the legislature. The 
Supreme Court has chosen not to impose a time limitation on the 
filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Any law which the 
legislature enacts which infringes upon the State Supreme Court's 
procedural powers elect not to adopt a filing limitation on a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is unconstitutional. 
If in fact, the State is arguing that Utah Code Annotated §78-
12-31.1 is a statute of limitations and not a procedural 
limitation, then appellant argues that the ninety day limit JLS. a 
suspension of habeas corpus rights and is violation of Article I, 
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution. As pointed out in appellant's 
brief on p.13, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that a one year 
statute of limitations imposed upon the commencement of post 
conviction relief was unconstitutional, because it conflicted with 
the Arizona Supreme Courts power to make procedural rules. 
C. Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31,1 does not contain any 
provision for excusable delay. 
Appellee in its brief attempts to argue that because the §78-
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12-31.1 limitation does not begin to run until the discovery or the 
opportunity of discovery of new evidence, it provides for excusable 
delay in the filing of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. As 
pointed out in appellant's brief, after discovery of the new 
evidence the appellant was not able to file his Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus within the ninety day period due to circumstances 
out of his control. (i.e. he was transferred to another prison 
facility and was not able to avail himself of the use of the 
contract attorneys in preparing his Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus.) Because of the shortness of the ninety day period in 
which to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the 
cumbersome prison system in which the appellant is forced to work, 
he has a legitimate excuse for missing his filing deadline. The 
timing of the discovery of the new evidence had little to do with 
the delay that he incurred in the preparing and filing of his 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. If the Legislature is going to 
impose such a limited period of time in which to file a Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, in order for it to be a reasonable 
limitation, the court must allow the petitioner to file his 
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus when he has legitimate excuse 
for missing the filing deadline. 
D. Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31.1 was not intended to apply 
to the Appellant. 
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It is interesting that the appellee cited and attached the 
transcripts from the legislative hearings held on §78-12-31.1 prior 
to its enactment. A review of these transcripts indicates very 
clearly that the intent in imposing the ninety day limitation on 
the filing of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus had to do with the 
legislature's concern that Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus 
were being used by attorneys to avoid the execution of a sentence 
imposed by the court. In fact, on p.l of said transcripts, which 
are attached to appellee's brief, it is so stated by Senator 
Barlow. He specifically pointed out two particular cases, the "Hi-
Fi Case" in Ogden and "a motorcycle case" in Carbon County. 
Senator Barlow goes on to state that: 
This is what often happens is that the defense 
attorney will know of grounds to postpone the 
carrying out of a conviction, but they won't 
say anything about it until after the trial. 
And is not a case where the person might be 
innocent or guilty. That has already been 
determined. Now this becomes a delaying 
tactic... 
It is also important to note that on March 7, 1979, when this 
bill was introduced into the House by Representative Sikes, he once 
again referenced the Hi-Fi murders. He specifically pointed to the 
long appeal process which served to delay the sentence of the 
court, that of death. He also referenced the case of Gary 
Gillmore, where a Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus was filed the 
evening before the execution and delayed it. 
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Based upon the transcripts of Representative and Senator who 
introduced this bill, it is clear that the intent of this bill was to 
prohibit attorneys from delaying the execution of the sentence of the 
court, rather than determining whether or not an individual, who is 
actually serving time during the pendency of his habeas corpus action, 
is guilty or innocent. In fact, it was stated by Senator Barlow that 
the Habeas Corpus actions that he was specifically targeting were those 
where guilt and innocence had already been determined and was not being 
challenged, but that the execution of the court was being challenged. 
The intent of the legislature in the filing of this bill clearly 
indicates that this ninety day statute of limitations on the filing of 
a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was not intended to be applied to 
an individual such as the appellant. In this case, the only 
determination that the appellant is requesting is a determination by the 
Court as to whether or not he is guilty or innocent. A hearing on the 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus would not delay the 
execution of his sentence in the least. 
Furthermore, the trial court has already determined that the Appellant 
has a meritorious claim. (See Exhibit 1 attached hereto.) 
Consequently, this statute of limitations should not be applicable 
to the appellant and he should be permitted to file is Petition for Writ 




For the above mentioned reasons the Appellant respectfully 
requests that the Court strike Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31.1 as 
being unconstitutional and\or permit his Petition to be heard by 
the Court. 
DATED this 7 day of T&h , 1993. 
STEPHEN CURRIER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 0 day of 
1993, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
Angela F. Micklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
Department of Corrections 
6100 South 300 East 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 




TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, 
Respondent. ] 
I ORDER OF SERVICE 
I Civil No. 92-85 
The above named Petitioner has filed a Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the Court has reviewed the same and 
finds that the matter is not frivolous, and 
THEREFORE ORDERS THAT the Clerk of this Court serve a 
copy of the Petition, together with all attached pleadings, on 
the attorney general of the State of Utah and the County 
Attorney of Carbon County. 
Service upon the Attorney General shall be made upon 
Deputy Attorney General Kirk Torgensen, 300 Fast 6100 south, 
Suite 204, Murray UT 84107. 
DATED this day of April, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER OF SERVICE by depositing the 
same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Stephen Currier 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper UT 84 020 
Kirk Torgensen «p *,//,* JX 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 7 O0 ' V i p C? CS °* 
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204 , 
Murray UT 84107 2b5" 5t3o 
Gene E. Strate 
County Attorney 
County Office Building 
120 East Main Street 
Price UT 84501 
DATED this U day of April, 1992 
0 
Clerk of Cou^t 
